Introduction
As in commercial fisheries, the number of participants in recreational fisheries is increasing around the world due to increases in wealth, leisure time, and tourism. In developed countries, 2.4% of the population, on average, participates in recreational fishing (Pitcher and hollingworth 2002) . In Nordic countries, the statistics for participation are: Denmark 12.5%, Iceland 31.5%, Sweden 35%, Finland 40%, and Norway 50% (Toivonen 2002) . In developing countries (e.g., South African line fisheries), only 0.5% of the population appears to be involved in fishing as a sport (Griffiths and Lamberth 2002) . The increasing number of participants in recreational fishing has placed pressure on marine resources. There is evidence of dramatic declines in four high-profile fisheries in Canada and in fish populations in several coastal regions of the United States, attributable to recreational fisheries (Post et al. 2002; Coleman et al. 2004) .
The desire to preserve resources requires more understanding of management measures in recreational fisheries and the conflicts with commercial fisheries as well. Such topics have been studied by fisheries ecologists and economic scientists (Pitcher and Hollingworth 2002) . Economic literature often deals with inefficient allocation of the resources under open access and often examines efficient allocation that maximizes the present discounted value of recreational and commercial benefits. Connell and Sutinen (1979) applied a bioeconomic model in the recreational context where angler demand was solely a function of the quantity of trips and the harvest per trip. Bishop and Samples (1980) consider the issue of the optimal harvest allocation of a fishery that is shared between commercial and recreational fisheries by adding a recreational sector to a standard commercial fishing optimal control model. Laukkanen (2001) studied the optimal exploitation strategy for four sequential fisheries, of which one was a recreational fishery, while Sumaila (2002) studied how the coexistence of sport and commercial fisheries in Namibia can be managed using the Nash equilibrium game theory.
A key question investigated in this article is if and how zoning can mitigate recreational-commercial fisheries conflicts. Marine spatial planning and ocean zoning have been seen as a way that may create a framework facilitating both the realignment of industry incentives and the attainment of the broader goal of healthier ocean ecosystems (Eagle, Sanchirico, and Thompson 2008) . The theory of spatial zoning focuses on the selection of a protected area and its size. There are two core objectives that motivate the creation of protected areas: conservation and sustainable provisions for human use. The second goal, relating to human use, points to the management of fisheries, recreation, education, and research.
We develop a bioeconomic model to address the competition and management of recreational and commercial fisheries. We study harvest strategies, focusing on the allocation of catches between these fisheries. We depart from the Bishop-Samples model because we study recreational and commercial fisheries in a standard bioeconomic model. However, we investigate the open-access management regime for both sectors as a base for further discussion. A consequence of open access in the two sectors is that one of the sectors may have to close down. We introduce a protected area for the recreational fishery as a measure to solve the conflict. We will compare the aggregate stock and aggregate harvest before and after the establishment of a protected area for the recreational fishery. This comparison is useful in examining how a protected area can contribute to a fishery management objective. To the best of our knowledge, this protected area modeling of recreational-commercial fisheries is novel.
Whether or not a protected area for recreational fisheries is established, the commercial fishery, by assumption, operates under open-access conditions. Several investigations regarding an open-access commercial fishery with the presence of a no-take marine reserve have been conducted (e.g., Pezzey, Roberts, and Urdal 2000; Sanchirico and Wilen 2001; Flaaten and Mjølhus 2010; Ngoc 2010) . The open-access regime is chosen in this literature to examine whether or under which conditions a marine reserve can create social and ecological benefits and work as a management tool, instead of applying conventional tools.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic bioeconomic model is presented, when the recreational fishery is without a protected area. We then analyze the interaction between recreational and commercial fisheries when the protected area is established for the recreational fishery. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of findings.
The Basic Model
We first consider the characteristics of a basic fishery model without a protected area. We assume that a fish stock is located in an area of unit size and that the natural growth rate of the fish population exhibits a logistic growth pattern, thus:
where S is the size of the fish population and r is the intrinsic growth rate. It should be noted that the carrying capacity is normalized to one and G(S) is a strictly concave function. The rate of change of the stock with the presence of the harvests is given by:
where g and h are the harvests from recreational and commercial fisheries, respectively. Equation (2) is the ecological model. We provide a simple model, which allows for the economic analysis of a fishery jointly exploited by recreational anglers and commercial fishermen. Since the utility of recreational anglers does not relate directly to the fish consumed (as it does with commercial fishermen), we use the benefit function for both sectors.
Following Bishop and Samples (1980) , we assume that v(S) is the gross benefit per unit of fish caught by recreational anglers, v ' (S) > 0, and j(S) is the average cost of catching fish in the recreational fishery, j ' (S) < 0. Thus, R(S) = v(S) -j(S) is the net benefit per unit of fish caught recreationally, where R ' (S) > 0. The demand for the recreational catch is perfectly elastic with respect to g.
For the commercial fishery, let p be the price per unit of the commercial catch, where the demand is assumed to be perfectly elastic, and c(S) is the cost of catching per unit of fish caught c'(S) < 0. hence, C(S) = p -c(S) is the rent, or benefit per unit, of the fish caught commercially. Note that the demands for recreational and commercial catches are perfectly elastic and the effort costs are linear in effort; thus, there is no consumer surplus or producer surplus generated.
Open-access Equilibrium
Open-access bioeconomic equilibrium occurs when there is simultaneously economic and biological equilibrium, with aggregate harvest equaling fish growth. The open-access bioeconomic equilibrium of a joint recreational and commercial fishery is implicitly defined by:
For the purpose of further analysis, we assume the net benefit functions for recreational and commercial fisheries to be   respectively. Anglers or fishermen may continue to fish until the net benefit is reduced to zero or until the stock level approaches the open-access stock level for each fishery.
By contrast, if the population is exploited by both recreational and commercial fisheries, there may be conflicts between them due to competition for the fishing areas and harvests. The difference in cost efficiency may lead to interactions between the two sec-tors. One significant question arising here is: what is the equilibrium point in this joint fishery? There are three possibilities. The present analysis will consider each possibility and examine how conflicts between the two sectors may affect the equilibrium stock and harvest of the fisheries.
If the two sectors are equally cost efficient:
it is immediately clear that the general open-access stock equilibrium of a joint commercial and recreational fishery can be achieved. At this stock level, both sectors coexist in the fishery. The aggregate equilibrium harvest includes the harvests of both sectors. Equation (6) is a strict constraint for a general equilibrium. A change in one of the parameters can violate this constraint, and it is possible that either the recreational anglers or the commercial fishermen may have to leave the fishery.
In the case where
, the recreational fishery is more advanced than the commercial fishery, in the sense that its combined technology, costs, and market values put more pressure on the stock than those of the commercial fishery. The commercial fishermen will have to leave the fishery. The fishery is only exploited by recreational anglers so the equilibrium harvest includes only the recreational harvest. In our model, the vessels are assumed to be homogeneous for simplicity. However, in actual cases vessels vary with respect to technical and economic characteristics, such as size, engine power, gear type, and cost structure. Heterogeneous fishing fleets may create an economic surplus. In such cases, some commercial fishermen may still be able to participate in the fishery since they can earn intra-marginal rent. Thus, coexistence between commercial fishermen and recreational anglers can easily be expected in actual fisheries. . The net benefit from the harvest of recreational fisheries is negative. Thus, in contrast with the previous case, the recreational anglers will leave the fishery. If the vessels are heterogeneous, an intra-marginal rent may exist and some recreational anglers may participate in the fishery. However, in the long run, the fishery will be exploited solely by commercial fishermen, so the equilibrium harvest for the fishery includes only the harvest from the commercial fishery.
There are two cases where a general equilibrium point for both sectors cannot be achieved. The open-access combination of recreational and commercial fishing does not assure the operation of both sectors. The question of how to manage each sector, provided the other sector operates under open access, will be studied. As the commercial fishery, by assumption, always operates under open-access conditions, we will discuss appropriate management measures for a recreational fishery to achieve equilibrium with harvest in both sectors.
Management Strategies for a Recreational Fishery with Competition from an Open-access Commercial Fishery
As discussed above, open access for both fishery sectors gives rise to three cases: the coexistence of the two fisheries, commercial fisheries only, or recreational fisheries only.
In the first case, due to the equilibrium open-access stock levels of the two sectors being equal, the operation strategy would be to allow open-access regimes in both fisheries. here, we will only examine the last two cases in order to investigate the appropriate management strategy for the recreational fishery, assuming that the commercial fishery remains open access. . In actual fisheries there is a possibility that rational commercial fishermen would adapt and use the same fishing technology as the recreational anglers if the recreational fishery were more efficient than the commercial fishery.
We assume that the manager uses the optimal strategy, which follows from maximizing the present value of the recreational fishery benefit. In the case of an autonomous model with a harvest that is linear in effort, a long-run optimal steady state exists and the optimal path towards the steady state is the most rapid approach (Spence and Starrett 1975) . Thus, we proceed by focusing on the optimal steady state. The objective function is then given by:
subject to:
with S(0) given and
, where max g is a constraint on the harvest capacity of the recreational sector and δ is the social discount rate. The objective of this problem is to choose an optimal control, g(t), for all t such that PV is maximized without exceeding the natural growth rate of the fish stock. The present value Hamiltonian resulting from this maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
where λ(t) is the shadow price of the population, also known as the adjoint variable. Since the Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable, g, the switching function will determine the optimal level of the catch for the recreational anglers in the fishery. The switching function is defined by
In the case where σ(t) = 0, the recreational harvest is on the singular path. Clark and Munro (1975) show that the vanishing of the switching function implies a singular solution for S that can be stated by the following equation:
S is the optimal level of the fish stock if the recreational fishery is optimal along the time path. Equation (10) is known as the golden rule in fisheries. It states that the optimal stock level for the recreational fishery is the level that maximizes the benefit. The presence of an open-access commercial fishery impacts the fish stock and, naturally, the management strategy for the recreational fishery. The optimal harvest policy for recreational fisheries will depend on the open-access stock level for commercial fisheries. Thus, the optimal approach for the recreational fishery to the general equilibrium can be stated as: . Note that this implies a need for a mechanism to share the total catch between the two fisheries.
Case 2: The recreational fishery is less economically efficient than the commercial fishery,
In this case, recreational anglers will not participate in the fishery since the stock level in open access is too low. Under this scheme, the spatial zoning approach is an appropriate management tool that can secure the operation of recreational fisheries, since it provides the security for recreational fisheries through the exclusion of commercial fisheries. Also, in relation to Case 1
, spatial zoning can be used for a similar purpose-to allow the two fisheries to coexist.
Protected Areas for Recreational Fisheries
There are several types of protected areas with different levels of protection, ranging from areas that allow certain extraction activity to those that are strictly no-take reserves. Managers can divide the ocean into a number of different zones and then decide on the best use for each zone. Bohnsack (1993) argues that a protected area reduces conflicts between user groups by physically separating the interests of fisheries and non-fisheries. In this article, we introduce a protected area for the recreational fishery as a measure to reduce conflicts between recreational and commercial fisheries by dividing the fishing grounds into two areas. There are some examples of zoning mechanisms like this in Australia. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park has some zones that allow recreational use only. In New South Wales, 30 Recreational Fishing Havens have been established utilizing fisheries management closures that exclude commercial fishing (Rayns, MacDonald, and Read 2006) . In this section, we will discuss how a protected area for recreational fisheries under an ocean zoning plan may assist in resource allocation for recreational anglers and how the aggregate stock and harvests are affected by a protected area.
Most bioeconomic models of protected areas are developed to examine the effects of protected areas (normally no-take reserves) on commercial fisheries (e.g., hannesson 1998; Sumaila 1998; Flaaten and Mjølhus 2010). Our model is designed to analyze the impact of a protected area for the recreational fishery on recreational and commercial fishing. The common approach in the bioeconomic models is to divide the marine environment into two patches, one for protection and one for fishing. In our case, a protected area for a recreational fishery segregates the fishing activities of the two sectors into two different fishing grounds. The commercial fishermen fish only outside the protected area. We will consider the relationship between these different groups: recreational anglers and commercial fishermen.
The creation of a protected area for a recreational fishery leads to a fraction, m, of the total area of unit size that must be set aside for the recreational fishery; 1 -m is the area for the commercial fishery. Since the recreational sector operates inside the protected area and the commercial sector operates in the outer area, we define 
Assuming that migration between the protected and outside areas occurs, the rates of change in the biomass inside and outside the protected area are modeled as follows:
where z is the migration rate, g m is the recreational harvest, and h m is the commercial harvest after the protected area has been established. These two dynamic equations will be used to first analyze the open-access equilibrium, then the optimal management of the recreational fishery within this reserve framework.
Open-access Equilibrium
The participants in the two sectors operate in different patches. The question of how to allocate the total harvest and the resources between the recreational and commercial fisheries is of interest. There are some key reasons for this. First, there is a biological linkage between the two patches due to the dispersal of fish between them, so the rate of change in the fish stock will involve the growth of the fish stock and the dispersal process. Second, allocation of resources will have consequences for the sustainability of the stock, the amount of the market value from the resource, and the social and environmental objectives of the fisheries (Sumaila 2002 
 
The open-access equilibrium stocks in the two patches can be defined by setting the net benefits in equations (14) and (15) 
Equations (16) and (17) . m can be seen as a resource allocation parameter. The choice of m may impact the stock level for recreational and commercial fishing and, consequently, it will affect the recreational and commercial harvests.
If we substitute the open-access stocks from equations (16) and (17) into (12) and (13) and let them equal zero, the equilibrium harvests for the recreational and commercial fisheries, which include two components-the natural growth rate and the migration rate between two patches-can be found by:
( ) (18) and (19), and it equals the combined natural growth rate of the fish stock inside and outside the protected area. Therefore, aggregate harvest gives the relationship between the fish abundance inside and outside the protected area and the harvests there.
There is an interaction between the two sectors due to the dispersal process, which may affect the harvest of each sector. The dispersal process can be seen as a spatial externality between the two sectors. Fishing activities inside and outside the protected area reduce the stock density. The relative density of the population will determine dispersal between the two patches. Thus, even when fishing in different fishing grounds, the activity of commercial fishermen may affect that of recreational anglers and vice versa. If the biological parameters r and z are assumed as given, then both the recreational and commercial harvests become a function of the economic parameters p c C and a c R . An increase in the cost of commercial fishing will increase the stock outside the protected area. This may help the recreational harvest increase due to the benefit from the dispersal from the outer area into the protected area. From equations (18) and (19) it is seen that both sectors may coexist when the protected area is created, even if they operate under an open-access condition and differ in cost efficiency. However, it should be noted that the open-access, steady-state harvest from one of the two fisheries may still be zero. When the growth rate in the protected area is equal to, or less than, the emigration from the protected area to the outer area, the recreational fishing must cease. When the growth rate of the outer area is equal to, or less than, the emigration from the outer area to the protected area, the commercial fishing must cease. This makes sense, as migration exceeding the natural growth seems unable to sustain the ecological equilibrium with a positive stock within each patch.
In commercial and recreational fisheries under open access, it is implied that the establishment of protected areas, with an open-access regime for commercial fishing outside and especially recreational fishing inside, still results in inefficiencies. The fishermen and the anglers continue to increase their efforts until their benefit equals zero. Further, because of the dispersal between the two patches, the aggregate stock will be fished down. It is assumed that 
Open-access Stock and Harvest ex-ante and ex-post the Creation of a Protected Area
To better understand and explain the role of the protected area for the recreational fishery, we should examine the aggregate stock and aggregate harvest increase when the protected area for recreational fishing is created. We will, therefore, compare the result regarding stock size and harvest before and after the establishment of the protected area for the recreational fishery. This comparison will show how the protected area can affect the operation of the two sectors and the equilibrium point.
In the case of open access for both fisheries, table 1 compares the aggregate stock and the aggregate harvest before and after the creation of a recreational fishing area. The total recreational and commercial harvests cannot exceed the sustainable yield (the natural growth rate of the fish stock). Although the equilibrium harvest equals the natural growth rate of the fish stock, the harvest of commercial fishermen is different from that of recreational anglers. This is due to the difference in cost efficiency. The cost difference affects the level of equilibrium fish stock and, in turn, harvest rate. Fish stocks in coastal oceans are more likely to be overexploited than underexploited. Consequently, higher cost may lead to an increase in the fish stock. This, in turn, makes the equilibrium harvest also increase. Therefore, the magnitude of the harvest of the two sectors depends mostly on the magnitude of the cost resulting from their activities.
The establishment of a protected area creates possibilities for increases in the aggregate stock and aggregate harvest. Whether the stock densities inside and outside the protected area are equal or not, the aggregate biomass and aggregate harvest after the creation of the protected area are at least equal to or larger than those prior to the creation of the protected area.
Recreational Fishery Management with Open Access for the Commercial Fishery
Now we assume that the recreational fishery is managed to maximize its resource rent. , the problem stated in equations (20)- (21) is, in principle, the same as in equations (7) S , inside the protected area; and δ is the social rate of discount. As above, the optimal equilibrium stock may be found from the golden rule equation: 
, is the marginal stock effect emanating from the recreational fisheries. Thus, equation (22) states that the optimal equilibrium sub-stock for the recreational fishery, * R m S , is one at which the sum of the marginal product of the stock and the marginal stock effect equals the social rate of discount. Note that the optimal stock implicitly given by equation (22) is affected by several factors, including the migration rate. Clark and Munro (1975) called the lhs of equation (22) the own rate of interest of the stock. In this case, both the marginal productivity of the stock and the growth term of the marginal stock effect are adjusted for migration.
Without a protected area, the optimal strategy for the recreational fishery discussed above implies that at steady-state growth, ( )
* R S G
, g * is allocated to the recreational fishery and h ∞ to the commercial fishery. In this state, the net benefit of the recreational fishery equals e -δt λ(t), and the net benefit of the commercial fishery equals zero. The conflict between the two sectors still exists. One of the two sectors may be excluded if the fish stock level falls below the level that can help it operate under its own management regime.
The creation of a protected area for the recreational fishery segregates the areas for the two fisheries. Thus, ( )
is only allocated for the recreational fishery, and activity of the recreational fishery is assured. The commercial harvest is assured by the natural growth rate outside the protected area and immigration from the protected area. The interaction between the two sectors is due to the dispersal process, which depends on the density difference between the two patches.
The net benefit of the recreational fishery so far has been studied as a function of economic parameters and the stock level inside the protected area. let us now investigate how the net benefit of the recreational fishery is affected by the fish stock inside and outside the protected area and by other relevant factors. The benefit from the recreational fishery solved from equation (22) is given by:
As opposed to the open-access solution that drives the stock to the zero net benefit level, optimal management with a protected area requires a reduction in the recreational harvest to where the benefit function satisfies equation (23) with the recreational fishery area, the open-access commercial fish density, and the marginal growth rate, and it decreases with the migration rate. This illustrates that the net benefit of the recreational fishery also depends on the dispersal between the two patches, so it will depend on relative densities and, hence, the cost-price ratio outside the protected area. This is in contrast to the case without a protected area. The benefits in this case must be considered in a system of ecologically connected patches. Removing one unit from the stock, inside or outside the protected area, will affect the spillover to another patch.
From equation (22) we can also obtain the steady-state harvest for the recreational fishery:
Thus, the optimal recreational harvest is a function of the discount rate, the marginal growth rate, the migration/recreational area ratio, the net benefit, and the marginal benefit. Both the optimal recreational harvest, * m g , and the optimal recreational sub-stock, * R S , are endogenous variables. To study the marginal effects on these two variables requires explicit functional forms and numerical simulations.
User Fee for the Recreational Fisheries and Open Access for the Commercial Fisheries
Instead of quantitative implementation of the optimal management strategy for the recreational fishery, the manager may impose a fee of f = e δt λ(t) on each unit of recreationally caught fish. This will result in a steady-state optimal fishery in the long run. From the switching function, we know that
The user fee may help the manager obtain the optimal fishery by use of the benefit function of recreational fishing. Recreational anglers stop entering the fishery when the net benefit vanishes; that is, when:
Equation (25) is the same as the switching function in the singular path. The application of this user fee may adjust the level of recreational harvest to the optimal level even if the participants in the recreational fishery operate under an open-access condition. To examine the effects of the biological and economic parameters on the change in user fee, e δt λ(t), following Clark (2005, p. 315) , we combine equations (25) and (23). Thus, the equilibrium user fee corresponds to the lhs of equation (23), and the effects are the same as discussed after equation (23).
A protected area may help to maintain fishing opportunities for both recreational anglers and commercial fishermen, since they separate fishing areas. This, in turn, may reduce the costly conflicts between users. However, if the fishery is unregulated, this may lead to a divergence between private and social benefits and costs. Consequently, protected areas cannot contribute to maintaining healthy fish populations. This point raises the need to develop, implement, and enforce management measures after zoning. While the commercial fishery is difficult to control, especially in the case of multispecies and small-scale fisheries in developing countries, a combination of protected areas and the imposition of the user fee on recreational fisheries may be an appropriate measure to manage and maintain the fish stock.
Stock and Harvest with a Protected Area in Place
In order to be able to address the effectiveness of different management regimes for a recreational fishery after the creation of a protected area, we make comparisons of the aggregate stock and aggregate harvests between open-access and optimal management regimes for recreational fisheries. Table 2 displays these comparisons. We know from theory that the optimal stock level, The optimal management of recreational fisheries enhances the stock inside a protected area; consequently, the aggregate stock also increases compared with the openaccess situation. The magnitude of the aggregate harvests will depend on the magnitude of the stock level inside the protected area for recreational fisheries. When optimal management is actually applied, the population inside a protected area for recreational fishing increases, and it begins to create a positive benefit for commercial fishing by dispersal flow. The harvest for open-access commercial fisheries may be higher than that under open access for recreational fisheries. However, the aggregate harvests may increase or decrease. There are three possible cases: 
Discussion and Conclusions
This article discusses a bioeconomic model of recreational and commercial fisheries and asks a pertinent question. In an open-access fishery, can an area reserved for the exclusive use of one of the two sectors maintain the coexistence of both recreational and commercial fisheries? Since recreational anglers and commercial fishermen compete for the same fish, the allocation of all or part of the resources to one group impacts the resources available to the other group. Under open access, each sector harvests the stock to the level where the net benefit of each fishery is dissipated, so the open-access solution may occur in one or both sectors. The participants in one sector may have to leave the fishery (or never enter it) if they are less efficient. Competition between the two sectors implies that the fisheries should be managed jointly in a sustainable manner.
This article provides the perspective for the creation of a protected area for recreational fisheries, which helps to redistribute recreational and commercial fishing activities to different locations. however, aligning the management systems used for the different sectors can be challenging due to the differing objectives and mechanisms. In addition, specific management policies will affect participants' behavior differently and, in turn, affect the aggregate stock and harvest differently. We applied a typical analysis under different management regimes. This analysis consisted of a comparison between the harvest and stock biomass levels before and after the creation of a protected area for recreational fisheries, especially under open-access conditions.
The comparison showed that the establishment of a protected area for recreational fisheries can ensure that both sectors can participate in the fisheries and resolve the conflicts amongst the participants from the two sectors. Protected areas enhance both the aggregate harvests and the aggregate stock biomass, even when both sectors still operate under open-access conditions. The application of optimal management regimes for rec-reational fisheries can help to increase the aggregate stock. Under optimal management regimes, aggregate harvests may be either higher or lower than those under protected areas for open-access recreational fisheries, depending on the magnitude of provide a means of avoiding and managing potential conflicts and ensuring that the needs of different sectors are addressed in a coordinated way. Zoning has the potential to improve the efficient use of marine resources.
For simplicity, in our model the benefit of recreational fisheries is a function depending solely on the fish stock. However, in reality recreational fishing is highly selective for the larger and older fish. The introduction of a size and age structure into the model may lead to a negative impact on the fish stock (a decrease in mean age and abundance of legal-sized species has been observed as the outcome in some recreational fisheries; e.g., Avery and Hunt 1981; Var and Nicola 2004) . Older individuals are selected by anglers; harvesting thus may decrease the lifespan of the populations. In addition, disturbance of the population structure caused by recreational fishing may impact the growth pattern, since larger fish are targeted for harvest (Healey 1980; Donald and Alger 1989) . As a result, the reproductive age classes may decline in exploited areas. The fish stock also decline due to this.
A protected area for recreational fishing may help the fishery manager achieve optimal and sustainable use of the marine resource. This involves making equal use of the resource, considering that commercial fisheries always operate under open-access conditions. However, a natural problem that arises from this situation is that the establishment of a protected area for recreational fishing can lead to increased opposition from commercial fishermen. This opposition occurs because commercial fishermen are more efficient and do not like losing their important fishing grounds. How managers deal with this problem is an important factor to consider. At this point we consider Smith and Pollard's (1996, p. 262 ) view of management: "Fisheries management should aim to achieve optimal and ecologically sustainable utilisation of the living aquatic resources." They clarified the concerns of fisheries management: This involves making the best possible use of the aquatic environment, considering all of the values and uses to which it can be put, from fishing of all kinds (commercial, recreational and traditional) to non-capture uses such as those of conservation, tourism and development.
From the previous analysis, we know that managers can impose a fee on recreational fisheries in order to obtain the optimal stock level. From a regulatory perspective, they could transfer this fee to commercial fishermen as compensation for their loss of fishing grounds. In addition, the dispersal of stock biomass from a protected area to an outer area is also evidence of a benefit to commercial fishermen, which could convince them to support the creation of a protected area for recreational fisheries.
Conflicts between commercial and recreational fisheries are increasing globally and creating challenges for fisheries' managers (Aas 2007) . This is primarily because each sector fails to recognize the impacts of its own activity on the other sector and because recreational and commercial fisheries have traditionally been managed in isolation. From our research, it is clear that only when we have a better understanding of recreational fisheries and their relationship with commercial fisheries can we formulate more effective management plans to conserve and sustain fish resources.
